



Risk-opportunity assessment


The Humboldt Foundation sponsors outstanding researchers from all countries and disciplines, who remain active members of the Humboldt Network throughout their academic careers. In light of the geopolitical changes that have occurred in recent years, we depend more than ever on your support. A responsible approach to matters of research security is crucial to safeguarding the invaluable asset of academic freedom. Due to your in-depth knowledge of the research topic, you can weigh the opportunities and risks associated with the planned cooperation from an expert point of view.

To ensure that every application is treated fairly, the selection committees consider each case on an individual basis. We aim to clarify any potential questions around research security in advance to provide the interdisciplinary committees with an optimal basis for making their decision.

Below, please find some guiding questions to help you **reflect on the research security of the intended cooperation**. Should concerns arise, please explain and weigh them in your risk-opportunity assessment.

Country-specific questions and export control:

- Does the applicant come from an [embargoed country](#)? In this case, please ensure the knowledge transfer associated with the cooperation does not affect country-specific embargo rules. Same as goods, the immaterial transfer of knowledge, known as “**technical assistance**”, may also be subject to export control restrictions ([BAFA Export Control and Academia Manual](#), p. 46, German only). If in doubt, please get in touch with your institution’s export control office. That an applicant has been issued a visa does *not* obviate the need to comply with foreign trade authorisation requirements.
- Does the applicant come from Australia, Japan, Iceland, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland/Liechtenstein, the UK, or the USA? For citizens of these ten privileged countries **or** the EU member states, no export control law audit is required, and no risk-opportunity assessment is usually needed. Individuals from states far outside the democratic norm should, however, be carefully considered.





Questions about the individual:

- How well do you know your cooperation partner and their previous environment? From what country does the individual come? With which institutions have they been affiliated in the past?
- Has the individual conducted research for military or comparable purposes in the past? Or were they associated with institutions that conduct such research? Does the individual collaborate with colleagues at such institutions?
- Does their list of publications indicate that the individual has worked on [security-relevant topics](#) (dual use, dual use of concern, sensitive technologies) in the past?
- In light of the political circumstances in the individual's country of origin, to what extent is it possible or to be expected that they will seek to appropriate research data or knowledge from the research cooperation?
- Does the individual's career path suggest economic dependencies arising from research funding sources/scholarships?
- What will the individual contribute to the planned cooperation? What can they take away?
- Will the individual be given access to knowledge, procedures or technologies that are not generally accessible? Will this access be regulated?

Cooperation-related questions:

- Does your cooperation project involve weapons research? To what extent does the planned project involve "dual use" or "dual use of concern" aspects? Does the project fall into the field of "[emerging technologies](#)"? Will basic or application-oriented research ([TRL level](#)) be conducted?
- How high is the risk of undesirable knowledge transfer? What measures will you/your institution take to prevent or minimise such a transfer? How significant would the potential damage be if third parties misused the research results? What could be impacted by such misuse?
- What reasons are there to conduct the cooperation despite the revealed risks? Which ramifications might result from not carrying out the intended project? Would it lead to competitive disadvantages for you/German academia if the cooperation were not to take place?

More information on the Humboldt Foundation's procedures and handling of security-relevant research is available on our [website](#). If you have any questions, please contact **Michaela Kreilos** (michaela.kreilos@avh.de) at the Foundation.

